Analyse dans la perspective phénoménologique de l'essence comme expression de "l'être" différent de l'"étant". Substitution, dans la subjectivité, de soi à autrui.

This paper describes Alfred Clebsch’s 1871 article that gave a geometrical interpretation of elements of the theory of the general algebraic equation of degree 5. Clebsch’s approach is used here to illuminate the relations between geometry, intuition, figures, and visualization at the time. In this paper, we try to delineate clearly what he perceived as geometric in his approach, and to show that Clebsch’s use of geometrical objects and techniques is not intended to aid visualization matters, but rather is a (...) way of directing algebraic calculations. We also discuss the possible reasons why the article of Clebsch has been eventually completely forgotten by the historiography. (shrink)

Rik Peels has once again forcefully argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he endeavors to refute the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and to advance what he calls the “New View” according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. I defend the Standard View against his new attempted refutation.

As an important factor related to the interests of enterprises, the attitude and behavior of employees are related to the company’s survival and the realization of business objectives. However, in recent years, with the rapid development of emerging industries and industry changes, the turnover rate of employees in the whole enterprise has been greatly improved. Frequent turnover of personnel will have a great impact on the stability of the company, the competitiveness of the enterprise, and the operating cost. Employee loyalty (...) and corporate culture satisfaction assessment is the core of sustainable corporate development, but most of the traditional analysis studies are based on the performance approach, using employee overtime, employee achievement, and company effectiveness as data sources, the former performance data is only a side view of the company’s situation, the latter as the data source of this study is a one-sided and involute form, and the data is not stable. Therefore, this paper proposes an analysis of employee loyalty and corporate culture satisfaction assessment based on sentiment analysis, using association rules and sentiment lexicons from anonymous employee evaluations to analyze the actual data. (shrink)

Is time flowing? A-theorists say yes, B-theorists say no. But both take time to be real. It means that B-theorists accept that time might be real, even if lacking a property usually ascribed to it. In this paper, I want to ask what are the different properties usually ascribed to time in order to draw the list of different possible kinds of realism and anti-realism about time. As we will see, there are three main kinds of anti-realism. I will claim (...) that if time is defined as the universe’s fourth dimension, there is no way time could be unreal. (shrink)

First published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In this paper, I offer a proof that a disastrous conclusion (namely, that any observation report confirms any hypothesis) may be derived directly from two principles of qualitative confirmation which Carl Hempel called the "Converse Consequence Condition" and the "Entailment Condition." I then discuss three strategies which a defender of the Converse Consequence Condition may deploy to save this principle.

An ingenious argument – we may call it the Argument from Excuse – purports to show that the Standard View of Ignorance is false and the New View of Ignorance is true. On the former, ignorance is lack of knowledge; on the latter, ignorance is lack of true belief. I defend the Standard View by arguing that the Argument from Excuse is unsound. I also argue that an implication of my case is that Factual Ignorance Thesis (FIT) is false. According (...) to FIT, whenever an agent A acts from factual ignorance, A is morally blameworthy (culpable) for the act only if A is morally blameworthy (culpable) for the ignorance from which A acts. (shrink)

Crispin Sartwell ingeniously defends the provocative thesis that mere true belief suffices for knowledge. In doing so, he challenges one of the most deeply entrenched epistemological tenets, namely that knowledge must be more than mere true belief. Particularly interesting is the way he defends his thesis by appealing to considerations adduced by such prominent epistemologists as William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Alvin Goldman and Paul Moser, each of whom denies that knowledge is merely true belief. In this paper, I argue that (...) the case Sartwell presents for his thesis fails. However, by examining why it fails, we may derive at least four important epistemological lessons: being justified does not entail being able to give a justification; we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as intrinsically conducive to truth and conceived of as extrinsically conducive to truth; we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as an essential criterion of knowledge and conceived of as an accidental criterion of knowledge ; and epistemologists need to specify how the telos of inquiry involves more than the acquisition of true beliefs.Socrates: Then tell me: what definition can we give with the least risk of contradicting ourselves? (shrink)

E. J. Lowe sets out in a recent paper1 to refute McTaggart's proof of the unreality of time, by exposing an ‘indexical fallacy’ in his disproof of the existence of tensed (i. e., A-series) facts.2 Lowe then develops an original account of what makes time the dimension of change, based on his own account of tensed facts. But in our opinion he fails on both counts: (1) he fails to refute McTaggart's perfectly sound disproof of tensed facts, which shows that (...) time can be real only if (Lowe and McTaggart not withstanding) it needs no tensed facts, and (2) he fails to explain the temporal character of change, since his account of it has an exact spatial analogue. In what follows we argue these two points in turn. (shrink)

Alice Le Goff ,Christian Nadeau | : Ce texte constitue une introduction au dossier. Il introduit les différentes contributions en mettant en relief leurs principales orientations. Ce faisant, il propose donc une cartographie conceptuelle, forcément partielle, des enjeux associés à la notion de démocratie épistémique et des enjeux du croisement de cette notion avec celle de démocratie de contestation. En un premier temps, nous revenons sur l’apport du procéduralisme épistémique et sur les questions qu’il soulève. Ensuite, nous revenons sur le (...) néo-pragmatisme et la façon dont il permet d’envisager une justification épistémique de la démocratie. Puis nous mettons l’accent sur les enjeux d’un dialogue entre modèle républicain de la démocratie contestataire et modèle épistémique. Enfin, le texte propose un résumé du parcours proposé dans le cadre de ce dossier. | : This introduction brings out the main lines of the articles collected in the present issue. Our aim is to provide the reader with a conceptual overview of the main stakes of epistemic democracy and of its intersections with the model of contestatory democracy. First, we focus on epistemic proceduralism, its contributions and the questions it raises. Second, we emphasize the way neo-pragmatism deals with the epistemic justification of democracy. Then, we insist on the interest of a dialogue between epistemic democracy and the neo-republican model of contestatory democracy. Finally, the text sums up the path followed in that issue. (shrink)

How is epistemic justification related to knowledge? Is it, as widely thought, constitutive of knowledge? Is it merely a means to knowledge, or merely a means to something else, such as truth? In a recent article in this journal, Hofmann (2005, Synthese, 146(3), 357–369) addresses these questions in attempting to defend an important argument articulated by Sartwell (1992, The Journal of Philosophy, 89(4), 167–180) and reconstructed and criticized by Le Morvan (2002, Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 56(2), 151–168). (...) This Sartwellian argument purported to show that, since epistemic justification is of merely instrumental value, it is not constitutive of knowledge. In this paper, I argue that Hofmann’s defense of Sartwell fails, but that its failure brings to light some important lessons concerning the nature of justification and its relationship to truth and knowledge. (shrink)

Ce livre est la relation d'un parcours - celui de Benny Lévy - à travers la voix de sa femme Léo, un itinéraire où les exigences de la pensée et les gestes quotidiens s'ajustent au plus près, alliant à l'extrême rigueur un généreux amour de la vie.« Dans la lumière sans complaisance des matins de Jérusalem, trois stations?: la maison, la maison de prière, la maison d'étude. Le soir, une fois par semaine, détour par le lieu d'enseignement où un public (...) bariolé, passionné, vient écouter le petit homme en noir. Simplicité des rythmes, transparence des jours, soi rassemblé. À Jérusalem, aucun mystère, pas de recoins obscurs grouillant de projections fantasmatiques. Mais ailleurs?? En d'autres temps??Le chef révolutionnaire sans nom, à l'existence improbable, en tout cas invisible, pouvait-il vraiment du chaos des faits et des discours faire émerger une vision et une visée claires??Il eut des maîtres. Côté philosophie, il se réfère à Sartre, Althusser et Lévinas. Côté sagesse d'Israël, il a été enseigné par un cabaliste ashkénaze, un rav français d'origine marocaine, un Yérouchalmi d'ascendance lituanienne. Enfin, au cour de l'énigme, quel lien entre ce tout jeune Juif arrivé d'Égypte, pathétique et ardent, en quête acharnée d'assimilation, et la fille du faubourg Saint-Antoine, placide, rigolote par parti pris, qui portait encore vivaces les traces des villes juives de Pologne?? Étrange rencontre. Plus étrange encore, la constance malgré les turbulences. ». (shrink)

Volume 52, Issue 11, October 2020, Page 1120-1125.

This article explores the influence of Spinozism on the deep ecology movement and on new materialism. It questions the stance of supporters of the DEM because their ecosophies unwittingly anthropomorphise the more-than-human-world. It suggests that instead of humanising the ‘natural’ world, morality should be naturalised, that is, that the object of human expression of ethics should be the more-than-human world. Moreover, the article discusses Deleuze’s Spinozism that informs new materialism and argues that stripping the human of its ontological privilege does (...) not deprive the human animal from its ethico-normative distinctiveness. Implications of the discussion for an education aimed at cultivating human sensibilities are explored. (shrink)